After a short review of recent developments in gravity modeling and an overview of the liberalization agreements in Europe, this paper measures the trade creation and diversion effects of major European agreements based on the results of a correctly specified triple-indexed gravity model with bilateral fixed effects. Discussion of the resulting trade creation and diversion focuses on the role of partner and non-partner country characteristics including size and relative factor endowments, as well as date, reciprocity, industry coverage, and rate of liberalization characteristics of the agreement. elaborate network of liberalization agreements among all regions of the world. These agreements are with a variety of different countries and differ in the degree of integration intensity, scope and the reciprocity of the liberalization process. The gravity model used is a fixed effects model with separate constants for the year, the importer and the exporter countries. It is augmented by time-invariant bilateral interaction fixed effects, as well as some other factors that explain bilateral trade flows. An analysis of the error terms for member country importer and exporter pairs against those of a member country importer from non-member countries is carried out over time to capture trade creation and diversion effects of liberalization agreements.
Introduction
, Feenstra (1998) , Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) have shown that one of the most successful ways to formulize international trade flows is through gravity-type models. Although, since Viner (1950) , it is known that the impact of any trade agreement is a combination of trade creation and diversion effects, gravity modelers have rarely tried to decompose these effects (Greenaway & Milner, 2002) . This paper analyzes the trade creation and diversion effects of major regional liberalization agreements in Europe based on a modified tripleindexed gravity model. Europe presents the ideal laboratory as it has the most Greece  GR  1994  1981  -1981  ----Hungary  HU  2004  2004  1993  -1992  1993  --Iceland  IS  1994  -1970  1973  ----Ireland  IE  1994  1973  1960  *   1973  ----Israel  IL  --1993  ----2000  Italy  IT  1994  1957  -1957  ----Jordan  JO  --2002  ---1977  2002  Latvia  LV  2004  2004  1996  -1995  ---Lebanon  LB  ------1977  2003  Lithuania  LT  2004  2004  1996  -1995  ---Luxembourg  LU  1994  1957  - Area (CEFTA) in 1993. The partner countries, the trade blocs, and the effective years of accession into these agreements are listed in Table 1 .
There are a number of similarities among these agreements; all aim at dismantling of trade barriers in manufacturing sectors, but no such goal is claimed for the agriculture or services industries. 1 Furthermore, the liberalization process for all is asymmetric, where the EU (or the EFTA) is scheduled to liberalize faster than its less-developed partners.
There are also some important differences in terms of duration and intensity across the agreements: tariff elimination in EMA is more gradual than EA -12 years versus 8 years, respectively. The intensity of the agreements is also different. The early cooperation agreements were nothing more than non-reciprocal preferential market access arrangements, which opened up the European markets to the partners, but a reciprocal liberalization was not expected from the partners. 2 The aim in the EA and EMA was to establish a free trade area, which involved an a symmetric reciprocal liberalization. The Customs Union agreement with Turkey intensified the reciprocal liberalization process dating back to 1963. Finally, the European Economic Area is the most intense form of liberalization, which also allows free movement of capital and labor. These differences across agreements potentially have varying trade creation and diversion implications.
Differences exist not only in the agreements but also in the characteristics of the partners involved. First of all, the CEEC, EFTA countries and Turkey are regarded as prospective members of the EU. 3 However, no such prospect exists of North African countries. To illustrate other relevant differences, Table 2 gives the gross domestic product, per capita GDP, the capital-labor ratio of all countries of the region, the GDP-weighted distance of their economic centers to EU capitals, as well as the average tariff rates on the years the agreements came into force and for most recent years, computed using import duties as percentage of imports. These differences are crucial in assessing the magnitude of trade creation and diversion impacts, and also in determining which non-partner countries and/or which sectors are going to be affected.
Gravity Model
There are two broad options for governments seeking to liberalize trade: unilateral or preferential tariff reductions. Both of these options lead to trade creation: the removal of trade barriers leads to the elimination of domestic sourcing by firms and consumers in some industries in favor of imports more efficiently produced in partner countries. However, Viner (1950) established that unlike unilateral liberalization, preferential liberalization also gives rise to trade diversion. 1 The objective of the EMA is also to gradually liberalize trade in agriculture. However, all it does in concrete terms is largely to lock in the status quo. Negotiations to improve on existing agricultural concessions are to be initiated after 2000. 2 The EU also has some preferential non-reciprocal trade agreements with their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific under Lome/Cotonou Agreements. These countries' export performance in the EU market has been disappointing. Therefore, the EU proposed free trade agreements in place of the non-reciprocal access these countries enjoyed before, just like the EMAs. 3 Note that accession to the EU implies participation in the EEA and the ECCU.
Since partner countries are favored in such discriminating agreements, the removal of trade barriers for partner countries may lead firms and consumers to source from less efficient suppliers located in a partner country rather than from the least-cost non-partner country.
Although gravity models have been frequently used in modeling international trade flows, they have not yet been successfully used in capturing the abovementioned trade creation and diversion effects of liberalizations, despite the improvements made to the model since its original development by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) . Unsuccessful examples include use of separate dummy variables for members of trade blocs and for non-members, with the expectation of negative coefficients for the latter.
In its simplest form, the volume of bilateral trade between two countries is explained with the size of their economy, and the geographical distance between their economic centers:
where T ij is the average volume of total trade between country i and country j over the period of analysis. d ij stands for distance the countries. Average GDPs of the two countries are denoted as Y i and Y j , respectively. Trade-promoting variables that capture different aspects of bilateral relations often find their way into gravity models. Common border, common language, past colonial relations and measures of cultural proximity can be counted as additions most frequently considered in the literature.
Furthermore, the basic model has also been augmented by monetary variables such as the real exchange rate (Bergstrand, 1985; Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1995) , and measures of exchange rate uncertainty as suggested by Thursby and Thursby (1987) such as foreign currency reserves (Matyas, 1997) . Variables coming from competing trade theories are also often added to the model. Measures of the relative factor endowments as suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, and measures of similarity as suggested by the Increasing Returns Theory can be found in gravity models of Balassa (1986) , Helpman (1987) , and Balassa and Bauwens (1987) :
where X k ij represents the vector of all trade-promoting variables, monetary variables, and variables from competing trade theories.
Typically, bloc dummy variables were used in these models to test for the significance of preferential agreements on trade volumes. Positive and significant coefficients for these bloc variables are interpreted as trade-promoting effects of the agreements among partners in comparison to third countries:
where D a ij is the vector of all dummy variables representing the preferential agreements between two countries.
Raising econometric issues, Polak (1996) criticizes such use of bloc dummy variables directly in gravity models as their inferences may be incorrect. He argues that the traditional gravity model seriously underestimates the trade volume among certain groups of countries. Hence, models with dummy variables that represent these groups of countries yield significant positive coefficients for the dummy variables. He then suggests that it is possible to salvage the gravity model if it is formulated to explain the shares of imports from various supplying countries in terms of relative distance, or, alternatively, if it is formulated to include a country dummy variable as some measure of the average distance from supplying countries, similar to Linnemann's location index.
Some other econometric problems with the specifications in the gravity models have also been raised. Wang and Winters (1991) argued against averaging the models' variables over time since that would restrict the parameters of the model to be the same for every year. The idea was to allow for changes in variables across years to capture the impact of the business cycles. Similarly, Baldwin (1994) argued that using total trade as the dependent variable imposes an unnecessary constraint of equal coefficients for imports and exports. The implied suggestion was to have separate regression models for exports and for imports so that the parameters of the gravity model could take different coefficients for each component of trade. Matyas (1997) took this idea further to suggest that a correctly specified model should have separate constants not only for each year but also for each exporter and importer country, proposing the triple-indexed gravity model. Matyas (1998) argued that when cross-sectional data are used in the analysis, the time effect is implicitly set equal to zero. Likewise, when time series data are used, the implication is that the home country effect is zero. He argued, however, that when panel data are used, as in most gravity models, there should not be such restrictions. Therefore, he argued for separate year, importer and exporter country constants to avoid the unnecessary and incorrect restrictions their absence would set. In this formulation, year fixed effects capture time-varying factors that influences volume of imports for all countries. Importer and exporter country fixed effects take into account time-invariant factors specific to the importer and exporter countries.
Later, Egger (2000) , and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) removed another restriction by adding bilateral interaction fixed effects. They argued that the triple-indexed model imposed zero interaction, which they tested and rejected in their application of a panel of APEC countries. Bilateral interaction fixed effects bring in the time-invariant influences for a country pair. These would take into account geographical, historical (including past wars), political, cultural (including similarity of languages), and other bilateral factors that lead to deviations from a country pair's normal likelihood to trade with each other. The inclusion of such a variable, they argued, would be more general than including variables for each factor mentioned above, as the majority of bilateral factors were usually unobserved.
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Taking all of these criticisms into account, the methodology used in this paper to capture trade creation and diversion effects is based on analyzing the error terms of the following correctly specified fixed effects gravity model:
where M ijt is country i's imports from country j at time t. λ t , α i , γ j , and δ ij are the year, the importer and exporter country, and bilateral interaction fixed effects, respectively. Unlike Egger (2000) or Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) , a distinction is made here between the importer and exporter in the computation of bilateral fixed effects, since this would allow an analysis of non-reciprocal trade agreements such as the Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements. Per capita GDPs of the importer and exporter countries, y it and y jt , as well as the real exchange rate e ijt and their foreign currency reserves, R it and R jt are some of the other variables in the model.
Two variables in the model come from the competing trade theories: similarity in economic sizes, SIM ijt , and relative factor endowments, RF ijt . These are computed as follows:
captures the similarity in the size of countries i and j at time t in terms of their GDP. When the two countries are of equal size, the term inside the parentheses takes the value of 0.5, and decreases as countries diverge in size.
measures the distance between the partner countries in terms of their relative factor endowments. K it and L it denote the capital stock and the labor force for country i at time t, respectively. When countries i and j have the same factor endowment ratios, this measure takes the value of zero, and increases as the difference widens. Capital stocks needed for the above measure are obtained using the perpetual inventory method:
where GFCF it is the gross fixed capital formation in country i at time t. Note that capital stocks are assumed to depreciate at a constant rate of 10%. Some bilateral factors that are typically used in the literature are also included. These are CB ij , CL ij , and COL ij , which capture the effects of common border, common language and past colonial relations, respectively. With the presence of Trade Creation and Diversion in Europe 599 these bilateral variables in the model, the error terms, φ ijt , are more refined, and can thus be interpreted as the time-variant bilateral effect on country i's imports from j at time t, which are not taken into account elsewhere. The idea is to control for all known bilateral factors so that the effects of liberalization agreements is predominantly reflected on these error terms. Consequently, this gravity equation is used to benchmark normal levels of imports. The deviations from the normal captured by these time-varying bilateral error terms are analyzed over time to measure trade creation and diversion effects.
This model was regressed separately for imports from industries grouped based on the factor intensity of production (Wolfmayr-Schnitzer, 1998) . The resulting five sectors are as follows: resource-intensive industries (Sector 1), labor-intensive industries (Sector 2), human capital-intensive low technology industries (Sector 3), human capital-and labor-intensive high technology industries (Sector 4), and human and physical capital-intensive high technology industries (Sector 5). The list of SITC-2 codes of industries in each sector is given in Appendix A. Since 2002 was the last year with a complete data set for all variables, the time period covered is 1962-2002. The analysis covers 42 partner countries' manufacturing trade with each other, and with 129 non-partner countries.
As one can see from the regression results given in Table 3 , the parameters assumed the correct signs and are significant, with the exception of the relative factor endowment differences, RF ijt . 4 Accordingly, imports of a country from another decrease with geographical distance between them, and increase with GDP and per capita GDP of both partners. Furthermore, increases in the real exchange rate, measured by the price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods decreases imports, and stability of exchange rates, measured by foreign currency reserves, increase imports. However, note that the real exchange rate becomes an insignificant factor for all three human capital-intensive sectors. The usual trade-promoting impacts of a common border, common language, and colonial links are also observed. The unexpected negative sign for the difference in relative factor endowments can be explained by the dominance of intra-industry imports in Europe's imports. The majority of European trade is with other rich countries with similar factor endowments, making the Increasing Returns Theory more relevant for Europe's trade.
To compute the trade creation and diversion effects in a way that allows comparisons, for each agreement and for each one of its members, the bilateral error terms from the regression model are averaged separately before and after the agreement for each of their partners in liberalization and non-partners. The sum of the changes with partners after liberalization produced a measure of trade creation, and the one with non-partners is used to measure the trade diversion effects. These changes are scaled so that the resulting figure gives these changes relative to the importer country's GDP. Explicitly written, trade creation and diversion measures for country i from an agreement a that took effect at time T during a period of analysis over N years are as follows, where P a is the set of partner countries:
Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Europe's Agreements
The resulting trade creation and diversion effects are given in Tables 4 to 11 for the European Economic Area, EU's customs union, free trade agreements of This section is organized according to some common observations across these agreements, which refer to characteristics of partner and non-partner countries, and features of the liberalization agreements that have an impact on the magnitudes of measured trade creation and diversion. Accordingly, the effects of liberalization agreements, either trade creation or diversion, seem to vary with the size of the partner countries. Agreements with bigger countries tend to have a bigger impact, especially on smaller countries with a longer partnership in a bloc. The most significant effects resulted from the European Economic Area, to a lesser extent from the Europe Agreements, and even smaller impact resulted from agreements with Mediterranean countries. These observed magnitudes of trade creation and diversion effects are somewhat proportional to the economic size of the partner countries in these agreements. A quick scrutiny also reveals that the impact on larger partners, new or old, are smaller, whereas more significant impacts have been felt by smaller old partners such as Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden, as well as new smaller partners such as Cyprus, Malta, Iceland. In Europe Agreements, too, the increases in imports from partners and non-partners are both more pronounced than those experienced by the EU members. In relative terms, similar observations can be made for each agreement analyzed.
The impact on capital-intensive sectors tends to be bigger in liberalizations with countries similar to the EU, whereas liberalizations with low income or low capital-labor ratio countries seem to have a bigger impact on resource-and labor-intensive sectors. For example, as a result of the EEA, the human and physical capital-intensive sector experienced the highest trade creation from the EEA. The experience in relatively poorer Southern EU countries of Spain, Portugal, and Greece has been different with more trade creation in labor-and resourceintensive sectors. Similar changes are also observed as a result of the ECCU: in addition to changes observed in Southern EU countries in Sectors 1 to 4, and those observed in almost all EU countries in human and physical capital-intensive sectors, significant trade creation is also observed in Sectors 1 to 4 in the original six EU countries. To analyze how the similarity in income levels of non-partners with partners affects the results, Figure 1 shows the relationship between per capita income levels in non-partners and trade diversion in these countries for each of the sectors as a result of all of the agreements considered. 5 First, even if not shown here, since the analysis is on non-partners, there is also considerable diversion effect of new partnerships on old partners. In fact, that is quite significant in the EEA and the ECCU, where income similarity is high between old and new partners. In Figure 1 , note that the largest diversions occurred in resource-intensive sectors and moderate diversions are observed in the labor-intensive sectors. Trade diversions in all three human capital-intensive sectors have been less than 0.1% of the non-partners GDP, with the exception of couple countries in Sector 5. 6 While there is clearly more diversion from poorer non-partners in resource-intensive sectors, diversion from richer countries is notable in human capital-intensive sectors 3 and 4. In the labor-intensive sector, and to some degree in human capitaland labor-intensive sector, middle-income developing countries have experienced decreases in their exports to European countries as well. It is also noteworthy that there is a general positive correlation with the magnitude of trade diversion and per capita income levels.
The largest diversions generally result when differences with partner countries in terms of income and capital-labor ratios are larger. These diversions occur from non-partner countries with similar income or capital-labor ratios with the partner. These are clearly observed in the Europe Agreements shown in Table 8 . For an overwhelming majority of the EU members, the Europe Agreements resulted in increases in imports from partners and decreases in imports from Trade Creation and Diversion in Europe 611 non-partners in Sectors 1 to 4. Figure 2 gives similar plots to Figure 1 separately for each agreement but aggregated over all sectors. The largest trade diversions occurred as a result of the ECFTA, the EA, and the EMA, ignoring the diversion from the outlier non-partner country of Zambia. The average diversion due to these agreements is about 0.1% of the non-partner countries' GDP. Note that these are the agreements where the similarity in income levels or relative factor endowments between the EU and its partners were the largest. The same is the case for the EMA, but the lower than expected diversion in this case is likely a result of fairly recent effective dates. Moderate diversions have occurred in the EEA and the ECCU where, income levels are similar among the partners.
Lastly, the date of enforcement seems to matter. Positive trade effects, especially trade creation, are larger on old partners than new partners in an agreement. Bigger reductions in average tariff rates over shorter periods of time tend to have much bigger trade creation and diversion effects. The situation in new partners of the EFTA shows the impact of date of liberalization. The changes in imports from both partners and non-partners are mostly positive and are much bigger than the changes observed in most recent partners, which are mostly negative. Somewhat similar effects are observed as a result of the European Community's agreements other than the EA and the EMA, given in Table 7 . Especially for the core EU countries, trade creation is significant with increases in imports from both partners and non-partners in all sectors. However, for other EU countries and for the new partners of the EU, there are some decreases in resource-intensive, labor-intensive, and human capital-intensive low technology sectors, more so with partners than with non-partners. The effects of early non-reciprocal cooperation agreements with Mediterranean countries and the Euro-Mediterranean agreements are given in Tables 10 and 11 . Large trade diversions were expected in the Mediterranean countries' imports as a result of the EMAs (Hoekman & Djankov, 1996) . Expected trade diversion in the Mediterranean imports has so far occurred only in Sectors 3 and 4 in small magnitudes. According to the tables, the cooperation agreements have caused trade diversion for the EU countries in the resource-intensive sectors, and created new trade in human and physical capital intensive high technology sectors. While the same effects resulted from the EMA, the effects on Sectors 2 to 4 have been different for these agreements. The effects on the Mediterranean partners' imports show that both the cooperation agreements and the EMAs have been unsuccessful in trade creation. Imports of these countries from partners have been negatively affected, while imports from non-partners have somewhat increased. Due its reciprocity, the result in the case of the EMA can only be explained by the very recent enforcement. Figure 2 shows that the EFTA and especially the CEFTA resulted in the smallest trade diversion, around 0.005% of non-partners' GDP, possibly due to the smaller scale of the agreements in terms of the number and size of the partners involved.
Conclusion
This paper developed a modified version of the triple-indexed gravity model with bilateral interaction fixed effects, and analyzed its time-varying bilateral error terms to measure the trade creation and diversion effects of major European liberalization agreements.
The majority of the agreements turn out to be trade creating for the European and its partner countries in all factor intensity sectors. The exceptions are the liberalization agreements made with less similar partners such as the
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Europe Agreements with Central and East European countries, and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries, especially in resource-and labor-intensive sectors. While the EU's partners in the Europe Agreements experienced trade creation, the latter agreement was ineffective in creating new trade.
A few observations are worth stressing. The impact of either the trade creation or diversion is bigger on smaller partners. This is especially obvious in the EEA, where the date of enforcement is the same, and the income or capital-labor ratios are similar among partners. Secondly, the date of enforcement matters. The impact of an agreement is much smaller for old partners and generally non-trade creating for newer partners. This can be observed when comparing the core EU members to countries that joined the EU in 1995 in ECCU and ECFTA agreements, and when comparing the EU members to its partners in EA and EMAs.
Lastly, similarity in income or capital-labor ratios seems to be relevant in determining the partners and sectors that will experience trade creation, as well as the non-partners that will be hurt by the trade diversion. Southern EU countries experienced the trade creation in resource-and labor-intensive sectors, whereas for the rest the impact on human and physical capital-intensive sectors was most significant as a result of the ECCU and the EEA. Another example came from the Europe Agreements, where trade creation was most significant in the first two sectors for the CEEC, and in the latter for the EU.
The largest diversions occurred as a result of the ECFTA, the EA and the MCA, where there were large differences in terms of income and capital-labor ratios between the EU countries and their partners. Furthermore, diversion typically occurred from non-partners from former colonies and developing countries, which are somewhat similar to the EU's partners in these agreements. This is reflected in a significant positive correlation between income and measure of diversion.
The diversion from Norway and Switzerland is noteworthy, given their similarity to the EU countries. These countries willingly excluded themselves from the EU. Although not conclusive, this finding raises the possibility of a domino effect of the EU's agreements suggested by Greenaway (2000) and Sapir (2001) , and might force these countries to reconsider their decision or to liberalize their trade separately with the EU's partners in these agreements. Similar potential exists for the former Soviet countries of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation given the effects of EFTA, and for Macedonia, Moldova, and Belarus given the effects of the CEFTA.
